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JOINT INTELLIGENCE INDICATIONS COMMITTEE

Report of Indications of Soviet-Communist Intentions

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No Change In Class. ☐

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By

From: 14 September 1950

To : 20 September 1950

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

Department of the Army

Washington 25, D. C.

21 September 1950

No. 7

1. SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD

JCS Declassification/Release Instructions on File

- a. The Soviet armed forces in being are in an advanced state of readiness for war and could initiate offensive operations with no additional warning. There are no indications of imminent Soviet hostilities.
- b. There are no firm indications of Soviet or Chinese Communist intentions to intervene overtly in Korea, but there are indications of continuing movement of supplies and probably of Korean personnel from Manchuria to Korea.
- c. Viet Minh attacks on French border posts have indicated an improvement of Viet Minh forces but there is neither evidence of overt Chinese Communist participation in present Viet Minh operations nor of beginning of the expected Viet Minh general offensive.
- d. There have been no reports of unusual troop movements in Europe but there is evidence of increased anti-aircraft preparations, build-up of military stockpiles, and increased Soviet control of the Satellite Armed Forces.

2. SUMMARY OF SOVIET-COMMUNIST OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD

- a. KOREA.--See current situation reports. Movement of supply columns from Manchuria into Korea is apparently increasing, but there were no additional reports during the period of Chinese Communist preparations for overt intervention in Korea and there is a similar lack of information on Soviet intentions.

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- b. CHINA.--There are no indications of preparations for an imminent attack on Formosa and there have been some reports of varying degrees of credibility that the attack has been postponed. Communist military preparations in the Hong Kong area are apparently increasing but there are no firm indications of an imminent attack on the Colony.
 - c. INDO-CHINA.--Viet Minh attacks on French border posts by improved Viet Minh forces have occurred. There is no evidence of overt Chinese Communist participation and the French do not believe that the attacks are the beginning of a general Viet Minh offensive.
 - d. GERMANY.--Continuing shipments of gasoline and spare parts into the southwestern portion of the Soviet Zone have been reported and AA protection for the Oder bridge at Kustrin is indicated. Cancellation of leaves for East German officials is probably in preparation for the October elections.
 - e. AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.--The Soviets may be preparing to adopt a softer policy towards Austria. There are some further indications that minor elements of the Soviet military headquarters in Austria are being moved to Hungary for unknown reasons.
 - f. CZECHOSLOVAKIA.--Increasing numbers of Soviet officers are arriving and measures for tightened Soviet control of the Czech armed forces are apparently proceeding rather rapidly. Recent information tends to confirm earlier reports of fairly extensive Czech civil air defense preparations during 1950.
 - g. RUMANIA-BULGARIA.--The opening of a pontoon bridge across the Danube between Rumania and Bulgaria near the Yugoslav border has been noted. However, there are no current indications of other similar bridges or of Soviet movements into Bulgaria. The Rumanians have established a civil air defense organization.
 - h. GREECE.--There are no reliable indications of a renewed guerrilla offensive in the near future but the return of small groups of guerrillas to Albania and increased supply shipments to Albania may be in preparation for intensified guerrilla operations.
 - i. ICELAND.--The Soviet herring fleet is reported remaining in Iceland waters despite the close of the fishing season. There is little available information on its activities and the reasons for or significance of the prolonged operations of the fleet.
3. COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES.--No significant change is evident during the period. Viet Minh attacks in Indo-China are indicative of their previously reported increasing capabilities. There is some further evidence of improved logistical capabilities in Europe.

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TAB "A"

REPORT OF INDICATIONS OF SOVIET-COMMUNIST INTENTIONS

Proceedings of the Joint Intelligence Indications Committee
20 September 1950

1. Indications of Intentions in the Far East.

a. There continue to be no reliable indications that the U.S.S.R. or the Chinese Communists are preparing for active intervention in the Korean conflict, and there is no new information available since the landings at Inchon which is indicative of the course of action which the U.S.S.R. will pursue.

- (1) No additional information has been received on a build-up of Chinese Communist forces in Manchuria. Field or combat forces in Manchuria are now estimated to number 85,000, in addition to military district troops. A report of 15 September that a large military convoy was moving into Korea from Antung, Manchuria has been investigated, and there has been no subsequent information which would indicate that this was a movement of Chinese Communist forces. It is believed, however, that recent reports of increased traffic in this area do indicate at least a continuing movement of supplies into Korea and, possibly, of transport of military personnel of Korean origin from Manchuria.
- (2) There is a lack of information as to whether the U.S.S.R. intends to reoccupy North Korea, which has been frequently suggested as a possible course of action when U.N. forces approached the 38th parallel. There have been no reliable reports of a movement of Soviet troops into Manchuria, but the U.S.S.R. would be capable of a rapid military occupation of North Korea either from the U.S.S.R. or with forces now based in the Port Arthur-Dairen area. There is no confirmation of a recent report that Soviet aircraft based in Shanghai are being moved to the North Korean border.
- (3) A report of 17 September that North Korean forces had been ordered to withdraw north of the 38th parallel is not supported by other evidence which indicates continuing strong resistance in the south and increasing resistance in the Inchon-Seoul area.

b. There are no indications of an imminent attack on Formosa. According to a recent unconfirmed report the Chinese Communists have postponed the invasion until 1951 and are now making "long-range plans."

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Although there are no firm indications that such a decision has been reached, there has been a growing belief in Chinese Nationalist circles in recent weeks that the Formosa invasion has been postponed. Reports of the movement of Third Field Army troops southward from the Fukien area are too fragmentary to indicate a major redeployment of Communist forces in South China, but there are indications that minor elements of the Third Field Army have arrived in the Canton area.

c. A report that Chinese Communist forces and agents are preparing for an attack on Hong Kong in mid-October is unconfirmed and appears similar to earlier reports that an attack was scheduled during August. There have been recent reports, however, that large quantities of small arms are being smuggled into Hong Kong. Although an attack on Hong Kong is a Communist capability and a continuing possibility, there are no firm indications that such an attack is intended in the near future.

d. In Indo-China, the Viet Minh have begun attacks on the lightly-held French border post of Dong Khe and probably on That Khe (just south of Dong Khe) and Pakha (near Laokay). The Viet Minh are also attacking the French garrison at Phat Diem (in the Red River Delta area). The initial attack on Dong Khe was launched by a force estimated at five battalions, supported by heavy mortar fire, and the Viet Minh units were the best-trained and best-equipped units which the French have yet encountered. The attacks are thus indicative of the considerable improvement of Viet Minh training and equipment resulting from Chinese Communist aid. The French do not believe that these attacks mark the beginning of a general Viet Minh offensive. Despite press rumors of Chinese Communist forces massing on the Tonkin-China frontier, there have been no indications of overt participation of Chinese Communist forces in current Viet Minh operations, and the French Air Force has observed no troop movements from Communist China in connection with the attack.

e. From the foregoing, it is concluded that:

- (1) There are no firm indications that the U.S.S.R. or the Chinese Communists intend to intervene actively in the Korean conflict, but the movement of supplies and probably of Korean personnel from Manchuria continues.
- (2) There are no indications of an imminent attack on Formosa and there is an increasing possibility that such an attack has been postponed.
- (3) There are some reports of increasing military preparations in the Hong Kong area but there are no firm indications that the Chinese Communists intend to attack in the near future.

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- (4) Viet Minh attacks on French border posts do not appear to be the beginning of a general offensive and there is no evidence of overt Chinese Communist participation, but the attacks do indicate the improvement of Viet Minh forces with Chinese Communist aid.

2. Indications of Intentions in Europe and the Near East.

a. Additional reports from Germany indicate that shipments of gasoline and spare parts into the Ohrdruf area in the southwestern portion of the Soviet Zone have continued and that gasoline is apparently being stockpiled in the area. A total of 75 carloads of spare parts is reported to have moved into the area during August, which suggests that a depot may have been moved or that an additional depot has been established. Preliminary reports also indicate that a Soviet AAA unit has moved to Kustrin on the German-Polish border, apparently to provide AA protection for the rail bridge across the Oder River (on the Berlin-Gdansk-East Prussia line). If the unit remains in the area permanently, it will indicate that the Soviets are giving increasing attention to anti-aircraft protection of the important transportation routes into Germany from the east. There are as yet no other indications that the Oder-Neisse bridges are generally protected by anti-aircraft, and the absence of such protection to date has been considered a significant negative indication of imminent hostile intentions.

b. Leaves have reportedly been cancelled for officials of the East German Government. There are no indications that this action was taken for any other reason than in preparation for the October elections.

c. The new Soviet Deputy Commander in Austria has informed the Austrian Chancellor that the U.S.S.R. is willing to consider a solution for various problems and he dismissed recent Soviet-inspired incidents in Austria as due to the "over-zealousness of local commanders." This new "friendly" policy in Austria may be the beginning of a softening-up policy similar to that which the U.S.S.R. has recently shown towards Iran. Such variations in Soviet policy towards Austria have occurred periodically, however, and present action does not appear to indicate any new development in Soviet tactics.

d. In Hungary, small groups of Soviet troops have been observed in a town near Budapest hitherto unoccupied by Soviet forces, and it is believed that small detachments of Soviet troops from the Headquarters of the Central Group of Forces in Austria are now present in two towns near Budapest. This is a further indication that elements of this Headquarters, which controls Soviet forces in both Austria and Hungary, are being moved to Hungary. The reasons for and extent of this move are not clear, however. A complete move of the Headquarters, Central Group of Forces (which is not indicated as yet) could be a preliminary to a withdrawal of Soviet forces from Austria, but such a development is unlikely so long as there are no Communist para-military forces in Austria with which to insure Communist control if Soviet troops were withdrawn.

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e. The cumulative evidence of several reports now indicates that there were probably substantial shipments of Soviet military equipment into Hungary during 1949 and early 1950 and that the bulk of this equipment was not distributed to Soviet or Hungarian troops but was secretly stored. There have been rumors of secret storage depots for Soviet equipment in Hungary but their existence has never been established by reliable observation.

f. Several recent reports have indicated that increasing numbers of Soviet officers are arriving in Czechoslovakia and it now appears that Pilsen will probably be the headquarters for the enlarged Soviet military mission to Czechoslovakia. This indicates that Soviet measures for tightening control and improving the combat effectiveness of the Czech Army are proceeding rather rapidly.

g. Rumania has established a Civil Defense organization under the control of the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of the Armed Forces for the announced purposes of protecting Rumania against the "effects of enemy air attacks." The announcement implied that the defense program was not yet in full operation. A recent report on expenditures for air defense in Czechoslovakia during 1950 indicates that \$20,000,000 was allocated for civil air defense. This defense program apparently got under way during 1950 and tends to confirm a previous report of construction of air raid shelters in Slovakia.

h. The Bucharest radio has announced that a pontoon bridge across the Danube River between Calafat, Rumania and Vidin, Bulgaria was opened on 3 September, and additional reports from the Turkish press have stated that this bridge was constructed by Soviet engineer troops. This bridge is near the Yugoslav border in an area in which there appears to be less necessity for a bridge for normal commercial purposes than at other locations further down the Danube. Other reports have indicated that construction of a permanent steel bridge at this point might be started this fall, and the pontoon bridge may be only a temporary expedient. The construction of pontoon or permanent bridges across the Danube between Rumania and Bulgaria has been considered a probable development prior to any large-scale Soviet troop movement into Bulgaria, but there are no current indications of construction of other such bridges.

i. Greek Army Commanders have expressed concern over the possibilities of renewed guerrilla activity in the Albanian border area and in Western Macedonia this winter resulting from infiltration of Communists from Albania and Bulgaria. At present there are no reliable indications that a major guerrilla offensive is imminent and action has been confined to small harassing operations. Small guerrilla elements have been reported returning to Albania from Poland, and there have been recent increased shipments, including small arms, into Albania. This activity could be in preparation for intensified Greek guerrilla operations but there is little information available as to the extent of such preparations.

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
j. A report from Iceland indicates that the Soviet herring fleet which has been stationed off Northern Iceland this summer is increasing in numbers although other fishing vessels have almost entirely departed. It was further reported, without confirmation, that these vessels were possibly armed. The presence of this fleet has been the subject of concern to the Icelandic Government all summer but there is little specific information as to its activities. The Soviets have utilized fishing vessels for reconnaissance and weather observation purposes.

k. From the foregoing, it is concluded that:

- (1) There are no conclusive indications of imminent Soviet hostilities in Western Europe, the Balkans or the Near East. An attack in any of these areas could occur without additional warning.
- (2) There are continuing indications of increased military preparedness in Eastern Europe, including increased military stockpiles, additional air defense measures, and tightened Soviet control of the Satellite Armed Forces.


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